18 The Demography of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

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No one knows how many Afghan refugees there are in Pakistan.

POPULATION SIZE: THE 'NUMBERS GAME'

Size of population is normally a key to any demographic discussion. Precise figures on the size of the Afghan Refugee population in Pakistan, however, are not available; estimated totals derived from a variety of systems are largely unreliable. Also, the few available 'mathematical observations and measurements' of vital statistics and related subjects may only be used as indicators of evolving physical, cultural and psychological patterns. In short, the statistics included in this discussion should be considered intelligent estimates, or, 'wild guesses based on inadequate data'.[1]

Various factors contribute to this mystery of the 'numbers game' so vigorously played by authorities involved with the care and maintenance of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. Some are cultural; some purely administrative. Some rise from pre-exodus traditions; some relate directly to the exigencies of exile.

One attitudinal aspect is of particular importance. Only rudimentary population data collection systems were ever operative in Afghanistan, particularly in the rural areas. None were institutionalized.[2] Nor had an appreciation of the efficacy of reporting deaths and births ever been inculcated successfully. Rather, the general feeling held that it was none of the central government's business who was born, or who died. Further, it was widely held that central

* The author wishes to express her gratitude to the Ford Foundation (Grant No. 835–0118), the Universities Field Staff International and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies for their support of the project which made this research possible.

governments sought demographic information for reasons entirely to their own benefit, either to impose local taxes, gain conscripts for the army, or enhance requests for international aid. Because of these attitudes, the bulk of the Afghan population were disdainful of interrogators and typically avoided volunteering information. When confronted, they either withheld or falsified responses so as to minimize expected bureaucratic extractions.

On the government's part, statistics were acknowledged to be a necessary tool for social and economic planning, but the data collection procedures generally did not lead to viable analyses. For instance, as far back as the 1960s a Soviet advisor, V. Chupir, a Russian manpower expert with the Ministry of Planning, was so pressed for a definitive population growth figure that he arbitrarily announced an annual rate of 2.5 per cent.[3] Subsequent governments, regardless of political hue, dutifully increased the Afghan population accordingly. Disregard for preciseness in establishing basic population data, therefore, affected the highest echelons of power, as well as the 90 per cent of the population who were non-literate and rural.

These attitudes seriously affected periodic attempts by pre-DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: established in April 1978) governments to conduct censuses and demographic surveys, many of which were lavishly funded by UN and inter-government aid.[4] The results were invariably questionable and judged to be of low reliability and validity.[5]

Finding it difficult to work effectively with unreliable figures, some development projects conducted their own sample, project-oriented studies.[6] In many cases these data were remarkably reliable, but their scope was limited.

These few comments serve to point out that there was no traditional respect for demographic accounting systems. Instead, all such efforts were generally perceived as serving vested interests to the detriment of the counted. A change of attitude has occurred among the Afghan Refugee population in Pakistan, however. The same fertile ingenuity once devoted to strategies avoiding enumeration, is now enthusiastically applied to ensuring acknowledgement. The incentive to stand up and be counted arises from the generous disbursements of everything from cash to shoes provided only to those persons listed on registration rolls. On the other hand, the prior reluctance to report deaths has been reinforced by the refugee experience: one less person on the rolls means less food for the family.

Table 18.1 Refugee influx: 1973–1983

After	*Population totals*
July 1973–April 1978 (following Mohammad Daoud's overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan)	Few hundred
April 1978–September 1979 (following Nur Mohammad Taraki's overthrow of the Republic of Afghanistan and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan)	109 000
September 1979–December 1979 (following Hafizullah Amin's overthrow of Nur Mohammad Taraki)	193 000
December 1979 (following Hafizullah Amin's overthrow by the Soviet army, installation of Babrak Karmal, and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan)	402 100
July 1980	over 1 million
May 1981	over 2 million
January 1982	over 2.5 million
December 1982	over 2.8 million
May 1983	over 2.8 million

Source: CCAR, Islamabad.

Before detailing a few examples of this newfound zest to be enumerated, it is well to consider the enormity of the problem. Official Government of Pakistan (GPO) figures issued by the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR) in August 1983[7] summarize refugee population growth (Table 18.1).

Since December 1982, the GOP has held to a consistently rising refugee population of over 2.8 million: claiming 2 846 748 on 30 June 1984. The GOP contends that this figure is inflated by no more than 10–15 per cent. Estimated average monthly arrivals of 2500 to 5000 during much of 1984 rose to 7000[8] in the fall in response to intensified Soviet offensives which began during the spring of 1984.[9] Widespread famine and starvation caused by these offensives it is predicted will

force other areas to evacuate to Pakistan.[10] It is imperative, says the GOP, to plan assistance on the basis of the 10–15 per cent inflated figures so as to avoid shortfalls when the anticipated increases materialize.

Monitors of international assistance to the Afghan Refugees, dispute the GOP figures. There is no positive evidence to support the contention of some critics that the GOP profers high population figures in order to defray some of their expenses, but, as the official GOP refugee population figures rose over one million, approached and then passed, two million, evidence of gross malfeasance and overregistration also surfaced. Steps were taken to redress the more blatant malpractices, but the uncertainty of runaway figures made credible assessment of aid requirements next to impossible. It was feared that donor scepticism might possibly degenerate into disinterest and threaten the entire assistance program.

Base planning figures

To establish some measure of credibility, the World Food Programme (WFP) determined (1981) to maintain a mean of 1.7 million in planning food commodity supplies. This figure was arrived at by dividing the amount of wheat actually distributed, by the daily per capita wheat ration of 500 grams. From January 1982 this base figure was raised to 2.1 million, and again to 2.2 million from July 1982. WFP continues to assess needs by this figure as of August 1984. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), however, uses a population of 2.3 million to assess other relief needs.

International donors and administrative officials are confident that stocks based on the 2.2–2.3 million figures are very generous and more than adequate as a guarantee against shortfalls and sudden increases in population. Their inflation estimates vary between 25 per cent and 30 per cent.

The evolution of the refugee administration and infrastructure establishment illustrates the confusion which gives rise to these divergent estimates of population inflation. When, in 1979, it became obvious that the influx was growing alarmingly, there were not enough trained personnel in Pakistan to screen and register refugees adequately. Local district administrators did their best, but were soon swamped; recruitment procedures were not only slow, but qualified applicants for government jobs were rare. Abuses were all too soon evident.

Registration: the Malik system

At the same time, it was noted that large groups of Afghan Refugees were normally accompanied by traditional *maliks* (elders; community leaders). This cohesive leadership was immediately called upon by the beleaguered GOP, and gratefully pressed into service to assist in both registration and distribution of relief items.

Initially this system proved reasonably effective. There was a certain amount of altruism; the traditional leaders functioned efficiently and few incidences of gross malpractice surfaced. Unfortunately, those who seek personal gain by manipulating the misfortunes of others soon learn to flourish under emergency situations. Time saw the replacement of many traditional *maliks* by 'ration *maliks*' who, in collusion with some members of the newly established Pakistani refugee establishment perfected 'tricks and deals' encouraging favoritism, discrimination, and inflated population figures.

Examples are legion. Most involve power politics. The more followers a malik has, the more influence he wields, the more influence, the more flexibility he has to bilk the system. Cases are on record of maliks claiming rations for 2000, even 12 000, or 15 000 followers, when in reality there might be no more than a few hundred, or a thousand at the most. Brother maliks conspired to claim additional followers by registering the same names at one or more RTVs (Refugee Tented Village[11]) by using photostats of sanctioned registration lists. There was no way to determine whether the names were entirely fictitious, or double registered. Yet there was danger in cancelling numbers, even on known bogus lists, because legitimate registrants holding these numbers could be penalized unjustly.

Registration: heads-of-families system

As evidence of such innovative subterfuges mounted and became too obviously blatant, a new procedure was devised (1980) which forbade the issuance of rations to tribal heads or any such large groups. As a policy, rations now must be issued only to heads of families.

In order to tighten the rein on inflated registration and, not incidentally, guard against the infiltration of KHAD (the DRA's KGB-styled intelligence system) agents and informers into the legitimate refugee population, GOP policy also requires each head of family to obtain verification of legitimacy from one of the Afghan

political parties in Pakistan, either in Peshawar (capital of the North-West Frontier Province [NWFP]) or Quetta (capital of Baluchistan Province). This led to more duplicity. Those wishing to remain independent of party politics will oftentimes seek verification from several parties. Nevertheless, it is on the basis of a party affidavit that the head-of-family obtains a coveted passbook which entitles him to a place on the registered rolls for relief aid.

The family distribution system has corrected many of the more obvious malpractices, but it too is fraught with loop-holes and has not resulted in reliable population figures. Besides, only about 40 per cent of the distribution has yet to be affected by the new system and unscrupulous maliks still manage to intimidate heads of families, demanding they inflate the size of their families in order to provide the maliks with a percentage of all receipts for services rendered or anticipated.

Re-enumeration

A vigorous house by house, tent by tent, re-enumeration was instituted in 1981 (Baluchistan) and early 1982 (NWFP) in an attempt to obtain more reliable population figures. Several factors hinder this process, among which the extraordinary mobility permitted the refugees by the GOP is of particular significance. No barbed wire encloses any of the refugee settlements. No restrictions prevent individuals from moving singly or in family groups anywhere inside Pakistan. The frequent movement of tents naturally creates chaos in the counting system.

In addition, more and more families are returning for short periods to home bases in Afghanistan to attempt some farming to provide food for the *mujahideen* (freedom fighters). Almost all adult males take periodic turns crossing the border to fight in the *jihad* (holy war; resistance) for a month or so, a fact which cannot be admitted because *mujahideen* are expressly forbidden to receive any types of humanitarian aid. Yet in this situation it is impossible to separate a man's role: he is both *muhajar* (refugee) and *mujahid* depending on whether he is in Pakistan taking care of his family, or across the border in Afghanistan fighting for the honor of his country. There are few 'full time' *mujahideen*. So, for these and similar reasons an individual may not be physically present at the time of re-enumeration (to strike such persons off the registration lists would, in my opinion, be unjust).

Multiple-registration ploys

Nevertheless, enumerating a mobile population which disappears and reappears is fraught with many frustrations. Refugees take advantage of their freedom and attempt to register at several sites along their routes of travel. Others have been known to claim newcomer status at the border transit/recording camps every time they return from short sojourns inside Afghanistan.

Other serious obstacles stem from the near impossibility of verifying the number of individuals claimed by family heads. Estimates vary from averages of 6–9 members per family, which tallies with the pre-DRA average household size of 6.2 persons. Each passbook lists the individuals in the family by name, but many listings go far beyond the average and the 'immediate family'. In this the refugees are not without guile, and their imaginative schemes are without bounds. Take, for an example, the experience of one administrator faced with a newly born child who was being passed from family to family for registration. 'All new babies look alike' he moaned.

According to another favorite gambit, a father registers with his women and children, including adult sons with their women and children. Later, each adult son will register as a head of family, and again claims as dependents their immediate women and children and also their father and mother. In this way a single individual may be registered five or six times.

Most importantly, accurate re-enumeration is hindered by the fact that female members may not be paraded before male personnel. At times the number of women per household burgeon beyond belief. Yet the tragedy of the war in Afghanistan has created many widows and custom dictates that they be given haven by male relatives. Without an actual head count, who is to dispute a man's reputed benevolence? Very few female personnel have been employed by the re-enumeration and monitoring authorities, although this problem has been acknowledged since the inception of the assistance program in 1979.

If successful, all these multiple-registration schemes can produce great benefits because disbursements are linked directly to family size. The temptation to engage in these practices, therefore, is often irresistible. Furthermore, some of these ploys appear to be thoroughly justifiable in the minds of those who practice them. Commodities obtained through multiple-registration help sustain the *jihad*, a cause worthy of any finagling. Only through inflating family

size is it possible to 'beat the system' beset with overly-long registration procedures. At the very best, it can take 2–3 months before a family qualifies, even though it is the first few months when newcomers are most in need of aid. Some families have been unregistered for over three years. They do not appear in the population count, receive no rations, and must depend on kin for food. In these cases, since the rations are being consumed by legitimate refugees, the logic of complaints and penalties over double registration escapes most of the accused.

Other sizeable (variously estimated from 130 000–150 000) unregistered groups live in urban areas and unauthorized settlements. GOP policy assumes that those who elect not to live in authorized RTVs do so because they have alternate means of livelihood. The regulations specifically state that only those registered in RTVs are eligible for relief assistance. Many of these unregistered refugees, however, are intellectuals and urban entrepreneurs who are unable to adjust to the essentially rural lifestyle provided by the RTVs, even though they find few rewarding opportunities for remunerative employment.

When survival becomes acute, these urban refugees sometimes persuade distant kin or fellow tribesmen living in the RTVs to add their names to passbooks. In addition, some urban refugees are harassed by Pakistani landlords demanding inclusion on refugee rosters in lieu of rent increases. Other Pakistanis are voluntarily added to family lists in order to enhance the local interests and economic advantages of registered refugees.

Improprieties abound. Nevertheless, it is a sad but demonstrable fact that many of the refugees who suffer most are the poor who are unable to manipulate the system. They do not know how to connive, and cannot compete with the crafty who would use them. The more affluent astute, on the other hand, adjust with minor inconvenience, considerable profit, and perverse delight in devising new accommodations to exploit every innovation designed to thwart their devious machinations. When those who succeed flaunt it, eye brows are rightfully raised. Afghans driving new Toyotas stoke local resentment and add credence to the accusation that all Afghan Refugees are capitalists fleeing with their ill-gotten gains, not from fear of political persecution. The legitimate majority are thus unjustly tarred with the brush of opportunism.

Despite all these difficulties, re-enumeration continues and every month the authorities announce that thousands have been 'de-listed'.

Claims of reductions of as much as half a million have been made. There is much see-sawing in this numbers game, however. Reduced totals often rise slowly, sometimes not so slowly, to former levels without visible evidence of comparable arrivals. On the other hand, too much zealous pruning can lead to injustices. In any event, because the unregistered most often take the place of the de-listed, the total registered population has remained fairly stable over the past year or so.

Refugee well-being and program credibility

The monitoring authorities admit to the impossibility of supervising every individual's registration, acknowledge that the unregistered cannot be left to starve, and allow that inflation is in large part balanced by the unregistered. They will even turn a blind eye to stocks crossing into Afghanistan to help avert impending famine and feed the *mujahideen*. Stockpiles must be maintained to meet possible emergencies, and guarantees must be secured to make certain not a single individual dies from starvation.

Multiple-registration and allowable degrees of inflation are tolerated for these reasons. But when bureaucratic duplicity, disingenuous maliks and gross misappropriations create 'phantom' RTVs and stockpiling generates immense individual profits, credibility is severely damaged. Such coupling of maladministration with opportunistic practices produces a quagmire of corruption. Constant efforts to weed out offenders and rectify abuses are made. By November 1984, 17 000 cases had been initiated against employees of CAR/NWFP (Commissioner Afghan Refugees/NWFP) for various charges, including 'inefficiency, indolence, negligence, and gross corruption'.[12]

In Baluchistan, a high official in charge of transport of refugee goods was court-martialed. Others at the highest level of responsibility have resigned rather than be brought up on charges. Despite the fact that these efforts have been widely publicized, outsiders persist in referring to the provincial refugee administrative complexes as 'houses of thieves'.

So, the 'numbers game' must be played on until the day the refugees go home. It is not an esoteric exercise. The numbers cannot be divorced from ration distribution which is the key to refugee survival. While attempting to foil large-scale diversions by unscrupu-

lous refugees and those who are not refugees, the authorities are at the same time determined to allocate sufficient supplies so no vulnerable groups are deprived of their entitlements. It is a matter of considerable satisfaction to all involved that no single individual has died of starvation and that primary malnutrition has never been a major problem. Nevertheless, a fine line divides allocation and disbursements.

For example, if commodities are allocated to the provinces according to the lower base planning figures and then distributed according to inflated figures, individual refugees receive proportionately less. Those who are double-registered make up for the cuts and manage; the honest with no cushion against such manipulations once again suffer. Further, if food cuts based on suspected bogus registration occur, some predict that many refugees will leave established RTVs, and move to swell urban centers and exacerbate the potential for turmoil. It is difficult enough as it is for the refugees to cope since the distribution of commodities such as milk and oil are consistently in arrears. If wheat rations, the diet staple, are cut, it would be impossible for many refugees to survive.

More disturbingly, profiteering from stockpiling made possible by discrepancies between allocations and disbursements, bogus registrations, and overly-inflated population figures is totally unacceptable to the international donor community. To assure strong international support, the 'numbers game' must continue to project program credibility so as to guarantee refugee well-being.

The static base planning population figure has accomplished this. Even though newcomers continue to arrive, there is no evidence of any shortage in wheat disbursements and the inflation cushion functions effectively as a guarantee against starvation.

The exact figure is perhaps not important. What is important is that too many have been forced to leave their homes, and if all the displaced, the registered, the unregistered, urban and rural, and new arrivals are counted, the figure of 'about three million' may not be overly exaggerated. This represents the largest concentration of refugees in a single country anywhere in the world. It is one-third the world's total of over ten million refugees. It also represents one-fifth of Afghanistan's pre-DRA population of about 15 million.[13] And, together with another 1.5 million Afghans living in Iran, plus uncounted hundreds of thousands scattered around the world, about one-third of the Afghan nation waits in exile.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION: AREA, DENSITY, AGE AND SEX

Area

Refugees arriving during the early part of the exodus, in 1978 and 1979, settled near the Afghan border, in Baluchistan and the NWFP. The disputed Durand Line which separates these Pakistani provinces and Afghanistan divides ethnolinguistically related Pushtun and Baluch tribal groups who account for the majority of the refugees. According to both Islamic injunction and the Pushtun Code of Honor (*Pushtunwali*) it was incumbent on Pakistani tribal leaders to provide succor for their distressed cultural kinsmen. Many instances of spontaneous generosity and genuine gestures of welcome are recorded. These continue.[14] The Government of Pakistan (GOP) also offered lodging in a variety of buildings, including rest houses, schools, hospitals and storage facilities, in addition to some food (wheat, sugar, tea), tents, clothing, bedding and a monthly per capita cash subsistence allowance.

As the flow accelerated, the burden weighed too heavily on both the tribesmen and the GOP. Pakistan appealed to the UNHCR[15] for assistance in April 1979. The refugee population then numbered 85 000. Within the next five months, from May to September, the population rose by 100 000, reflecting an average increase of more than 1000 refugees a day. By September 1979 there were 45 000 (24 per cent) in Baluchistan, 140 000 (76 per cent) in the NWFP, with heavy concentrations in the federally administered tribal agencies (FATAs[16]). Kurram and North Waziristan agencies alone hosted 61 per cent of the refugees in the NWFP (46 per cent of the total refugee population in Pakistan) in September 1979.

From the outset, UNHCR urged the GOP to remove refugee concentrations away from border areas and establish organized settlements so as to discourage DRA incursions and bombings of Pakistan territory,[17] and facilitate orderly aid disbursements. Many large groups had settled as close as 2–4 miles to the border; even closer in the case of some in Kurram and North Waziristan. UNHCR's efforts in this respect were impeded, however, by both the refugees and the GOP.

The refugees were reluctant to move away from tribal affiliates who had been so supportive. To move from the borders was tantamount to admitting that a quick return to Afghanistan was not

possible. The GOP cited problems of poorly developed physical and administrative infrastructures, unavailability of government lands, particularly in the NWFP, and scarcity of water and other basic amenities, including grazing areas. By September 1979 there were only 39 organized Refugee Tent Villages (RTVs): 34 in Baluchistan, where more public lands were available, and 5 in the NWFP.[18]

Gradually, however, refugee groups began to move into the interior on their own, making their own arrangements with landlords, or simply setting up encampments near water sources or work opportunities. Fertile Peshawar District (NWFP) became such a magnet that registration was suspended during 1980 in order to encourage refugees to seek accommodation in other districts and agencies.

The situation was chaotic and UNHCR persisted in its efforts to regularize settlement. It was hoped, for instance, that reliable potable water schemes established with the assistance of UNICEF (United Nation's Children's Fund) would lure refugees to RTVs. In addition, an improved administrative infrastructure gradually evolved.

As a result, registration and aid disbursements were limited to a steadily growing number of officially-designated RTVs. By mid–1984 these totalled 349 RTVs in three provinces (Table 18.2); 279 RTVs (with 4 new areas under preparation) in 17 districts/agencies of the NWFP, with 72 per cent of the refugee population (64 per cent in the Settled Districts; 36 per cent in the FATAs); 60 RTVs in the 6 districts of Baluchistan, with 25 per cent of the refugee population; 10 RTVs (10 others under preparation) in Isa Khel sub-district of Mianwali District, Punjab Province, with 3 per cent of the population.

The Punjab Province was requested to accommodate long-term unregistered refugees after registration in the NWFP was officially closed early in 1982 because saturation endangered the total social and economic fabric of that province. The Punjab Government chose a site in Mianwali District not too far from the border with the NWFP, just outside the small town of Kot Chandana on the west bank of the Indus River. For the first time, a permanent water system and other administrative amenities were provided prior to the arrival of the first occupants. This settlement extends for five miles and differs from other RTVs in that the 10 commodity distribution centers, each designated as an RTV with its own Village Administrator catering to about 10 000 persons, cluster around the administrative buildings, instead of being located in separate areas

Table 18.2 Area distribution of Afghan refugees: June 1984

	RTVs	*Population*
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE		
Settled Districts	*RTVs*	*Population*
Abbottabad	20	135 766
Bannu	7	48 901
Chitral	6	25 448
Dir	14	81 756
D. I. Khan	12	109 215
Kohat	20	221 952
Malakand Agency	3	34 808
Mansehra	9	89 915
Mardan	23	222 009
Peshawar	60	325 501
Swat	3	11 424
	177	1 306 695
FATAs		
Bajaur	30	210 560
Kurram	32	274 802
North Waziristan	31	187 599
Mohmand	1	15 208
Orakzai	2	13 823
South Waziristan	6	38 394
	102	740 386
NWFP TOTAL:	279[1]	2 047 081[2]
BALUCHISTAN		
Districts		
Quetta	4	86 458
Chaman sub-district	5	44 982
Pishin	13	153 664
Gulistan	12	171 142
Zhob	4	35 090
Loralai	7	73 093
Chagai	15	161 744
BALUCHISTAN TOTAL:	60[3]	727 173[4]
PUNJAB		
Mianwali District	10	91 552
PAKISTAN TOTAL:	349	2 864 806

Notes

1. On 25 November 1984 CAR/NWFP announced that the number of RTVs had been reduced to 235 by merging some smaller settlements (The *Muslim*, 25 November 1984, p. 1).

2. Re-enumeration since March 1984 reduced this total to 1 876 000 as of 25 November 1984. Unregistered Afghan refugees in the NWFP numbered 200 000 (*ibid*).
3. In December 1984 the total number of RTVs in Baluchistan was announced to be 61 (personal communication).
4. Officially reduced to 507 000 in November 1984 (personal communication).


Sources: CAR/NWFP fortnightly statement ending 15 June 1984; CAR/Baluchistan fortnightly statement ending 31 May 1984; CCAR/Islamabad 30 June 1984 total was 2 846 748 (Baluchistan 711 367; NWFP 2 043 229).

throughout the settlement. Each family is assigned to one of these distribution points where disbursements are collected, but the family head may construct a dwelling wherever he chooses, usually as close as possible to next of kin who had arrived earlier. A new site at Dara Tang, on the Punjab border 80 km. west of Kot Chandana, is being prepared for future arrivals.

Some unregistered families had been living around the fringes of RTVs in the NWFP without drawing rations for as long as 2–3 years. Still, the move to the Punjab, which began on 15 December 1982[19], was extremely unpopular with the refugees because of ethnolinguistic differences with the Punjabi population, and because the area is renowned primarily for its extreme heat.

Many refugees, therefore, opted to forgo the opportunity to receive rations rather than comply with orders to move. Others registered only to move back to their original sites near kin or established work opportunities, returning periodically to receive rations. As early as January 1983, some administrators estimated that 25–30 per cent of the Punjab registrants would ultimately leave by the back door, and even casual observers have noted that during the summer months the Punjab RTVs are depleted. Even families with established residences typically move to the hills or return to Afghanistan to farm during the summer.

Taking note of the extreme dissatisfaction with the Punjab RTVs, CAR/NWFP has relaxed their rigid requirement that all unregistered groups relocate to the Punjab. Instead, they keep the NWFP population static by alloting de-listed numbers to the nearly 300 000 (1984 estimate) unregistered refugees in their province. Four new RTVs (Nowshera, Akora Khattak, and two near Shabkadar – all in exceptionally lush agricultural areas of Peshawar District) were established in 1984 for this purpose. This is not a new phenomenon. In the spring



Map 18.2 Afghan refugees in Pakistan, June 1984

of 1982 new RTVs were established in Swat (3) and Malakand Agency (3) to accommodate the unregistered, mainly from Hazara, Mardan, and Peshawar Districts.[19]

All new arrivals, however, will now be directed from border transit camps to the Punjab. Despite the pressures, the concept of *refouler* or rejection of those seeking asylum, is abhorent to the GOP and most Pakistanis, who will continue to extend a welcome to the Afghans in the traditional manner.

Settlement Patterns

The GOP organization table states that basic RTV units may not exceed a population of 5000 or approximately 1000 families. In reality, most exceed the limit. Single unit populations above 20 000 are recorded in Baluchistan at such sites as Mohammad Khel III (Quetta District) with over 24 000 (total for Mohammad Khel I-IV is 86 458). In addition, contiguous RTVs which began as separate, small encampments of kin-related families have grown and melded to form solid settlements covering vast areas.

Surkhab RTV (Pishin District, Baluchistan), for example, is listed with three units of 9.5, 8.9, and 15.4 thousand individuals respectively. Since there are no visible divisions between these units bordering both sides of a virtually dry river bed for twenty miles, Surkhab RTV give the impression of being one extensive settlement with 4962 households (33 909 total population), complete with neighborhood bazaars. Thus, Surkhab RTV resembles any number of large villages and small towns in rural Afghanistan.

Also, as in Afghanistan, there are many variations in settlement patterns. Some RTVs crowd 15 000 households into a 5-square-mile area (Mardan, NWFP) while others provide 2000 families with spacious homestead-style accommodation over a 25-square-mile area (Kohat, NWFP).

Among the remotest RTVs in Pakistan are those located in Chagai District (Baluchistan) some 220 miles southwest of Quetta, midway between this capital city and the Iranian border.[20] There are 15 RTVs in this bleak area dominated by pebbly deserts and mobile-sand-dunes. One, Posti, is in reality a series of small hamlets, each with only 3–10 close-kin-related households, strung along the length of a narrow 15-mile-long valley hedged in by barren, rocky mountain slopes leading into Afghanistan's Hilmand Valley.

Chitral is another remote area. This northernmost NWFP district sits at the northern end of the 2400 km: 1500 mile arc along which the

RTVs are scattered. Snow blocks the Lowari Pass through which relief supplies from Peshawar must travel, isolating Chitral for as many as five and six months at a time. Rations must be stockpiled well in advance. This creates many logistic and distributional problems.

Elsewhere in the NWFP settlements are equally varied, although there is a higher proportion of smaller concentrations closer to the prescribed 50 000 population maximum. Nevertheless, Pakistan's largest RTV, Barakai (Mardan District), located in the heart of the NWFP, peaked with a registered population of well over 130 000; uncounted unregistered families settled on its outskirts. The social and economic pressure these masses placed on the local population, particularly on the district capital city 35 km. to the east, became so intolerable that a new RTV was established at Haripur (Hazara District) with only the unregistered from Baraki. The Haripur RTVs now threaten to outnumber the parent RTV. In spite of such overcrowding, no major outbreaks of violence with the local population have occurred.

Concentrations of unregistered Afghan Refugees are found in large urban areas such as Peshawar, Karachi and Islamabad. These can be immense. One section of Peshawar, just beside the affluent Cantonment, for instance, is now almost exclusively Afghan and referred to as 'The Afghan Colony'. In Karachi, Afghans rent apartments. Because rents are extremely high, extended families normally crowd into single-family units. Once a family is ensconced, it is not unusual for other kin-related families to rent apartments above and below them, forming what are in effect high-rise RTVs. So many Afghans have gathered to live in Islamabad's G–9/4 sector, that it is now known as the 'little Kabul' of Islamabad. Pakistani's claim Afghans account for 30 per cent of the occupancy of G–9/4.

During the latter part of 1984, concerted efforts were made to force some of these groups to move to RTVs, particularly in Sind, Peshawar and Quetta. Strong emphasis was placed on expunging cities of 'bachelors', who were rounded up from hotels, apartments and private houses and bused to nearby RTVs. Hotels in Peshawar are now forbidden to rent rooms to single Afghan males.[21]

Much of this had to do with a series of bomb blasts[22] set off in Peshawar which were thought to have been the work of KHAD agents and assassination squads sent down by the DRA. In fact, evidence accumulated over a year or more indicates that these agents do rent whole floors in hotels as bases for their nefarious activities.

CAR/Baluchistan began shifting families out of Quetta in October 1984, when about 800 families were moved to Shirin Ab RTV, Chagai District, in the vicinity of Girdi Jangal RTV. It is proposed to move other groups (such as some Ghilzai to Loralai and Muslimbagh RTV and Durrani to Latifabad), but this may take some time as water supplies have not been adequately organized.[23]

Population density ratios

Density ratios vary according to these diverse settlement patterns. In most of the NWFP where the local population density is 164 per square kilometer, the ratio between the local population and the refugees is generally estimated at 6 to 1, but in the FATAs, with a local population density of 77, the ratio rises, occasionally even 1 to 2. Baluchistan's population density is limited to 15 persons per square kilometer because of vast tracks of underdeveloped wasteland. Only 5 million acres out of 50 million arable acres are being farmed because of the absence of adequate irrigation systems.[24] In many areas, therefore, the refugees far exceed the local populations. An extreme example is the town of Chagai with a local population of 3000 surrounded by 18 000 refugees.

Population age and sex distribution

Officially, the age distribution is given as 48 per cent children under 15; 28 per cent adult females and 24 per cent adult males. However, one of several recent surveys found that 57 per cent of the refugee population were children under 15: 22.5 per cent 0–5 years with 98 males to 100 females; 34.5 5–15 years with a male:female ratio of 82:100. Of the adults, 36 per cent of the population was 15–45 years with 88 males:100 females. In the 7 per cent group over 45 years of age, there were 260 males:100 females.

These findings were questioned by some who feared the 260:100 male to female ratio indicated a much greater maternal mortality rate than was suspected. In April 1984, the Centers for Disease Control (Atlanta, Georgia) was contracted by the UNHCR to determine infant and maternal mortality rates. Their findings estimated infant mortality at 156 per 1000 live births. The maternal mortality rate was 1176 per 100 000, which is high but comparable to the Pakistani population.

By comparison, the pre-DRA infant mortality rate was estimated

between 182 and 210 per 1000 live births, the highest infant mortality rate in Asia.[25] Also, a 1971 survey[26] found that there was an excess of males over females in all age groups, except from 1–4. The overall sex ratio was 116 males:100 females, but rose as high as 222:100 in the age group 75–79. GOP pronouncements continually stress that the adult male refugee population is primarily 'old men'.

As mentioned above, the reliability of such statistics is questionable, but since it would appear that about 75 per cent of the refugee population is composed of two vulnerable groups, women and children, much attention is now being paid to strengthen programs for them. Health assistance, which has always been of major concern, has effectively staved off major epidemics. Some say it has been overly generous. These critics lament the fact that indiscriminate pill-pushing is creating a deplorable dependency on medical drugs. A number of the voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) are, therefore, focusing on preventive health services, primary health education and maternal-child health (MCH) programs. Training of *dais* (midwives) and lady health visitors (LHV) from the refugee community is also being slowly introduced and expanded.

The birth rate in the RTVs appears to be very high because both men and women express an intense psychological need to replace those who fall on the battlefield. Although acute malnutrition due to insufficient food has never been a problem among the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, secondary malnutrition noted among children under 5, and pregnant or lactating women is normally due to insufficient intake, traditional weaning habits and eating preferences, or diarrhoea-related illness caused by contaminated food and water, and poor personal hygiene. The health education programs among Afghan women at the MCH are, therefore, of immense importance, particularly in reducing the relatively few cases of severe marasmus noted among infants under one year.

Education has also been receiving intense emphasis recently, particularly among girls and young women. This represents a most encouraging development. In the early days of the exodus even the mere mention of education for girls was anathema and those who advocated it were branded as 'traitors' and 'communists'. These passionate negative attitudes have cooled, but the number of girls attending schools in the RTVs is still minuscle and puberty still signals the end of schooling for most of the students.[27]

The future of teenage girls and young women living with unregistered Afghan refugee families in the urban areas is cruelly bleak. In

pre-coup Afghanistan they had taken an education for granted and looked forward to a wide variety of career opportunities. These young women now face the ire of ultra-conservative religious vigilantes who seek to curtail the activities of women outside the home. As a result, urban girls brought up to believe it was their *duty* to contribute to society find that they are now not only denied the facilities to complete their educations, but they are also deprived of opportunities to participate in any activities outside the home. In addition, because of the precarious financial straits in which most of these families find themselves, the urban refugees are hesitant to enter into marriage contracts. Girls of marriageable age are, therefore, often doubly penalized. Most potential female contributors to Afghanistan's future sit at home; an urgent challenge for assistance planners.

Two remarkable institutions seek to ameliorate this situation: the Nazaneen Primary School for Girls assisted by Inter-Aid, a Pakistani-based VOLAG, and, the Nahid Shahid Girls School (8 grades), also assisted by Inter-Aid through the Union of Mujahid Doctors, an Afghan organization. Other VOLAGs, such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) are currently investigating the feasibility of expanding education programs for boys and girls, men and women. In addition, the UNHCR offers scholarships for men and women to continue college educations, particularly in the fields of medicine, education and engineering.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION

Each major component of Afghanistan's kaleidoscope of ethnic groups[28] is represented in the refugee population. They come from every Afghan province. The Pushtun lead with 94 per cent, found in every RTV and representing rural, urban and nomadic backgrounds. Pushtun also dominate urban concentrations.

Semi-nomadic Pushtun groups make up about 29 per cent of the refugee population and are concentrated primarily in NWFP districts such as D I Khan, Kohat and Mansehra, with growing numbers in the Punjab where they occupy the eastern fringe of the settlement at Kot Chandana.

A good number follow patterns established in Afghanistan.[29] They live in houses or canvas tents provided them by the refugee establishment in the RTVs during the winter. In the summer they migrate with their flocks to grazing areas in the hills where they live in their

typical black goat-hair tents. The introduction of almost 3 million head of livestock into these mostly barren areas has created a severe strain on an already fragile ecology, necessitating some restrictions by the authorities on the movement of nomadic refugees. Nevertheless, travelling on Pakistan's main highway between Peshawar and Rawalpindi, the famed Grand Trunk Road of Moghul days, is reminiscent of travelling in similar areas of Badakhshan during peak migration periods.

The DRA has always maintained that there are no real refugees in Pakistan and that most of the Afghans outside their borders are nomads who have traditionally crossed back and forth across this border for generations. A recent broadcast in Pashto over Radio Afghanistan accused Pakistan, again, of deceiving world public opinion on 'the question of so-called Afghan refugees, who are fugitives and nomads that Pakistan prevents from returning home by force in order to obtain aid from the western countries'.[30]

The Hazara, from the central mountainous plateaus of the Hazarajat, are found mainly in the city of Quetta (with small pockets in Peshawar) where they are assisted by Pakistani Hazara whose forebears came to Baluchistan as refugees during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880–1901).[31] They have created a hillside suburban development in Quetta which almost replicates their settlements in Kabul at Deh Mazang and Koh-i-Asmai behind Kabul University.

Almost all Afghan Baluch, primarily from the Hilmand Valley, have settled among their ethnolinquistic cousins in Baluchistan, particularly in Amri and Posti RTVs (Chagai District). These are isolated settlements, far away (104 and 40 miles; 5½ and 2 hours respectively) from the small district town of Dalbandin, 220 miles; 7 hours southwest of Quetta. The Baluch Sardars maintain strong, centralized control.

The Nuristanis were the first major ethnic group to openly revolt in October 1978,[32] and the first rural refugees to settle in Pakistan. Most Nuristanis live in small family groups scattered throughout the many high valleys of Chitral, far away from administrative centers. Others have settled close to the castles of Chitral's former ruling families. Larger RTVs with access to roads and towns exist in Chitral, inhabited by a few Pushtun from the Ningrahar/Laghman, Nijrao/Tago areas as well as Tajik from Parwan, the Panjsher Valley and vicinity of Kabul. Most Tajik, an estimated 3 per cent of the refugee population, are concentrated, however, in Bajaur Tribal Agency.

The Turkoman and Uzbak generally form distinct enclaves with

their own bazaars in the larger RTVs in the NWFP. However, the progress of the resistance inside Afghanistan and the 1983–84 Soviet blockage of key passes out of northern Afghanistan has forced refugees from the northern areas into all sectors of Pakistan. A large group of Turkoman in Saranan RTV (Gulistan District, Baluchistan) were unable to use the direct route from Kunduz to the NWFP, for instance. They journeyed the length of Afghanistan, via Bamiyan and the Hazarajat, and crossed over at Chaman (Baluchistan), where they were assigned to Saranan RTV by officials at the border transit camp. Other Uzbak and Turkoman from Aqcha and its environs had lived for twenty years or more among the Pushtun in the Hilmand Valley. They have settled among their Pushtun compatriots in Girdi Jangal RTV (Chagai District, Baluchistan). Still others were relocated in 1982 from Peshawar District to Kot Chandana RTV (Mianwali District, Punjab), where they have established a distinct colony at the western edge of the settlement.

There is another Uzbak colony from the Baghlan area of Afghanistan living among a majority Pushtun population inhabiting an unauthorized settlement in Karachi (Sind Province), at Surkhab Kot which has an interesting history. An Afghan Pushtun family in the business of exporting Afghanistan's famed dried fruits and nuts had developed a long-standing, closely-knit network of connections with the Pakistani business community, and prospered. When a large group of their fellow tribesmen came as refugees to Peshawar and found registration closed, they headed south to claim aid from their affluent cousins. Land was purchased, mosques and schools built, a clinic established, and, most importantly, an imposing *hujra* (guest-house where leaders entertain, officiate and counsel their constituency) opened. Surkhab Kot thrives in direct defiance of GOP regulations which prohibit refugee settlement outside the designated three provinces of Baluchistan, NWFP and Punjab.

Uzbak who had lived as *hamsaya* (clients) of these Pushtun at Surkhab Kot also migrated south on finding no help forthcoming in Peshawar. Surkhab Kot, continues to grow as refugees attracted by optimum work opportunities at the port and industrial parks of Karachi arrive. The population in 1983 was estimated at 9000. Those newcomers without former ties to the original benefactors, however, are charged a tax for the privilege of residing in Surkhab Kot.

The Kirghiz, another Turkic-speaking people, came down from the high Pamir mountains into Gilgit (Northern Areas) in August 1978. Coming from high-altitude encampments at 12 and 15 000 feet, the

Kirghiz fell victim to newly encountered low-altitude diseases such as malaria, hepatitis and intestinal disorders. Religious conservatism imposed strict seclusion of the Kirghiz women who were used to working freely with their menfolk. Responding to their plight, the Turkish Government offered to resettle the Kirghiz; other Turkic-speaking Afghan Refugees were also given the option of resettlement in Turkey. A 13-flight airlift in August 1982 carried about 4.5 thousand Turkic-speaking Afghan Refugees to Turkey where they are generously accommodated.[33]

OCCUPATIONAL DIVERSITY

About the only restraint the GOP places on the Afghan refugees is to prohibit them from doing what most of them do best – farm. Some do, but only on small plots of government-owned land. The Posti RTV inhabitants have acquired an admirable reputation for their ability to farm vegetables in a relentlessly hostile environment where no one before them had envisaged the feasibility of habitation, much less cultivation.[34] They have accomplished this by applying water-management and engineering techniques perfected over the centuries in Afghanistan. Other groups living in the desert beyond Girdi Jangal RTV (Baluchistan) have performed an equally miraculous agricultural feat. Finding the local melons vastly inferior to the justly famous Afghan melon, they commissioned *mujahideen* to bring back melon seeds from Afghanistan. Crossing these with the hardy, but tasteless, desert melons, they have produced a sensational gastronomical delight. In addition, the ILO (United Nations International Labour Organization) has launched a vegetable seed distribution project so that RTV families may augment the ration diet.

Most Afghans, however, have had to restructure, probably only temporarily, a basic factor in their value system. To till the land and be self-reliant in providing well-being for a family is a matter of pride; a symbol of identity, self-respect, and status to most Afghans. Pushtuns, particularly, look on trade and service to others as somewhat demeaning occupations. Afghanistan was certainly no nation of shop-keepers. To be denied the right to cultivate was a psychological trauma for many. However, Afghans are incapable of sitting around idle while opportunites abound, even if it means twisting a prejudice or two to suit the situation.

Thus, as the Pakistani media regularly complain, the Afghans have

maximized opportunities and 'taken over' a number of segments of the economy, especially transport. Also, small sidewalk retail business abound wherever the Afghan Refugees congregate. The plethora of these stands recedes dramatically as snows melt in the passes. Then baubles and satins are exchanged for Kalishnikov assault weapons as the young men again melt into the countryside of Afghanistan to fight the invader.

Rug, antique, and boutique merchants have simply transferred their businesses to Pakistan; large serai have been completely taken over by refugee merchants. Leather workers, potters, weavers, tailors and other artisans have set up going concerns on their own, or with assistance from VOLAGs such as Inter-Aid, Caritas [Pakistan] and the Austrian Relief Committee. The GOP encourages all such self-reliance efforts, except where competition threatens small local industries. Permission to open a soap factory in Mardan, for instance, was denied.

Despite a growing number of these enterprises, the assistance community worries over increasing signs of 'dependency', which threatens to demoralize a people long lauded for their self-reliance who now find themselves forced to depend on hand-outs in order to survive. Such dependency is insiduous, and, because it can so easily become an attitudinal habit, it jeopardizes the very essence of Afghan culture.[35]

The emergency phase of the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan has largely stabilized and emphasis is gradually shifting to focus on income generation, skills training and education. ILO's US$ 2 million program[36] promotes such projects, mainly through established GOP institutions. Most observers agree, however, that those projects which help to prime Afghan initiatives are by far the most successful.

Carpet weaving is a case in point. Turkoman families with capital set up looms in their homes in the RTVs. The whole family works together and the results are admirable. Families in all three provinces who depend on refugee assistance, however, must work with inferior, short-staple wool, harsh dyes and 'new' patterns (including medallions with mosques and other disruptive figures) from the SIDB (Small Industries Development Board). The results are travesties. Even more distressing are the carpet factories set up in some RTVs where Pushtun boys are taught on vertical looms to weave Pakistani adaptations of traditional Turkoman designs. These results are just plain sad.

Afghan skilled labor is much appreciated. It fills the gap of Pakistani

laborers who have left to work in the Gulf states. Contractors commend the Afghans for being better workers, more reliable, and less argumentative than local labor. The Afghans are also willing to work for less wages, for which loud abuse is heaped upon them for ruining the labor market for Pakistanis, who must demand an income permitting them to buy the food the Afghans are handed free.

The World Bank's US$ 20 million (funded mainly by the USA and Japan) labour-intensive, income-generating project begun in 1983 seeks to assist both Afghans and Pakistanis by generating employment and compensating Pakistan for refugee-related damage to its ecology. Using a labor force of at least 50 per cent Afghan Refugees, this program includes reforestation in areas of high refugee concentration, the repair of roads damaged by refugee-related transport, and repair and extension of over-used water resources and irrigation systems. In this way it is hoped that the development of Pakistan may be stimulated and the negative aspects of the refugee influx may be offset.

THE FUTURE

These developments in the Afghan Refugee assistance sphere occur at the same time that stewards of global refugee affairs have concluded a new approach must be formulated to deal effectively with the growing tragedy of refugees throughout the world. In essence, the new approach searches for durable solutions accompanied by related development assistance to both host and returnee countries. This is the first time development assistance has been closely related to programs seeking solutions to refugee-related problems.[37]

This is an avenue of bold, innovative thinking because the traditional mandate of UNHCR specifies that the agency is to provide humanitarian relief, with emphasis on relief. Hitherto, the fine line between 'self-reliant schemes', or 'durable solutions' and 'humanitarian relief' has been hard to maintain. Yet in Pakistan, it has been of utmost importance so as to make sure the distinction is discernable at all times. To allow the distinction to be obscured would raise implications fraught with spectres suggesting that Pakistan recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet-puppet DRA regime and sanctioned the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets. More explosively, it would suggest that Pakistan has accepted the perma-

nency of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. To speak of the 'resettlement' of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is to thoroughly misread present and future objectives.

The Afghan refugees are now welcomed as temporary guests in Pakistan, but it is uncertain what political havoc would be generated if it were determined there was no longer any hope for them to return to their homeland in Afghanistan with honour. For the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, repatriation with honour would seem to be a long way off. But it is well to be prepared. The recent interest in gathering more reliable demographic data on the Afghan Refugee population in Pakistan will greatly assist what must be hoped will be an eventual repatriation and resettlement inside Afghanistan.

Notes

1. Louis Dupree, 'Population Review 1970: Afghanistan', *American Universities Field Staff* (AUFS), South Asia series, vol XV, no. 1, 1970, p.1.
2. For a summary of efforts made by pre-DRA governments to institutionalize data collection, see Graham B. Kerr, *Demographic Research in Afghanistan: A National Survey of the Settled Population*, Afghanistan Council of the The Asia Society (New York), Occasional Paper no. 13, December 1977, Introduction. (May be obtained from Afghanistan Forum, Inc., 201 East 71st Street, 2K, N.Y., N.Y. 10021.)
3. V. Chupir, *Population and Manpower in Afghanistan: 1345–1350 (1966/67–1971/72)*, Royal Afghan Government, Ministry of Planning, (mimeo), Kabul, March 1967. (Discussed in L. Dupree, 'Population Review', *op. cit.* [note 1]).
4. Central Statistics Office, Prime Ministry, Republic of Afghanistan, *A Provisional Gazetteer of Afghanistan: Afghan Demographic Studies*, 3 vols., Kabul, 1975; *National Demographic and Family Guidance Survey of the Settled Population of Afghanistan*, 3 vols., sponsored by the Government of Afghanistan and USAID/Afghanistan, State University of New York at Buffalo (SUNY), 1975; Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Planning, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, *Statistical Information of Afghanistan (1975–1978)*, Kabul, December; 1978.
5. *Population Policy Compendium: Afghanistan*, Population Division of the United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1984.
6. Rarely published, but see I. Stevens and K. Tarzi, *Economics of Agricultural Production in the Hilmand Valley* (Denver, 1965); Ronald W. O'Connor (ed.), *Managing Health Systems in Developing Areas: Experiences from Afghanistan* (Lexington, Massachusetts, D. C. Heath and Company, 1980).

7. The Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, Government of Pakistan, *Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees*, (Islamabad, August 1983), p. 11.
8. UNHCR Islamabad, interview reported in The *Muslim* (daily newspaper of Islamabad), 3 November 1984, p. 8. On 29 October 1984 the Karachi Domestic Urdu Service reported an influx of 3000 Afghan Refugee families (22 000 individuals) into Northern Waziristan.
9. For monthly eye-witness reports from inside Afghanistan, see *Monthly Bulletin*, Afghan Information Centre, P.O. Box 228, Peshawar, Pakistan, and, *Afghan Realities*, Peshawar Edition, Afghan Information and Documentation Centre (AFC), P.O. Box 324, Peshawar, Pakistan.
10. Frances D'Souza, *The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan*, Afghan Aid, 18 Charing Cross Road, London, WC2N OHR; Edward Giradet's series in the *Christian Science Monitor*, especially 26 September 1984, p. 1; *Time Magazine*, 10 September 1984, p. 26.
11. Although an estimated 60 per cent of the refugee population now reside in *katcha* (pisé or mud brick) housing, the refugee settlements are still referred to as Refugee Tented Villages in order to emphasize their temporary status and promote the principle that the Afghan presence in Pakistan is only a passing phenomenon.
12. Interviews with CAR/NWFP: *Khyber Mail* (daily newspaper of Peshawar), 22 June 1983, p. 1; The *Muslim*, 25 November 1984, p. 1.
13. Variously estimated from 12–19 million; independent observer estimates were much lower. See Kerr, *op. cit.* (note 2), p. 2.
14. A voluntary individual donation of Rs9000 (US$ 540) was made by a local tribal leader in North Waziristan in October 1984 to aid a recently arrived group of 3000 families from the Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Logar, Paktyka and Samangan; The *Muslim*, 29 October 1984, p. 1.
15. Headquartered in Geneva, UNHCR is the lead agency responsible for humanitarian aid for the Afghan Refugees.
16. The seven Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) were mostly created by the British late in the 19th century; only three were created after Pakistan came into being in 1947: Mohmand (1951) and Bajaur and Orakzai (1973). The FATA extend north from Baluchistan Province in the following order: South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur. All but Orakzai have a common border with Afghanistan.

    The FATA are administered by the Governor of the NWFP, who acts as the agent of the President of Pakistan, who represents the federal government. Policy concerning the Afghan Refugees is set by the President. For more on the FATA, see Akbar S. Ahmed, *Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1977).
17. From 1978 to 11 December 1984 a total of 765 border incursions had been officially noted by the GOP: Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace 634 times; ground violations (cross-border shellings) totaled 131. The total killed (Afghans and Pakistanis) numbered 158:121 in bombing raids; 37 in shellings. The injured numbered 71: 44 in bombings; 27 in shellings (The *Muslim*, 16 December 1984, p. 1).

18. GOP briefing to UNHCR Mission to Pakistan August–September 1979.
19. For an eye-witness account, see Ekber Menemencioglu, '100 000 Afghans to be moved to the Punjab by the end of 1983', *Refugees Magazine*, August (no. 4), 1983, pp. 7–10.
20. Hanne Christensen, *Sustaining Afghan Refugees in Pakistan*, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, (UNRISD), Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, 1983.
21. The *Muslim*, 9 August 1984, p. 1; 6 November, p. 6; 25 November, p. 1. *New York Times*, 25 November, p. 5. According to these accounts, 10 5000 had been shifted by the end of November 1984, and an additional 5000 were expected to be moved by the end of 1984.
22. The *Muslim*, 25 October 1984, p. 1.
23. Personal Communication.
24. F. D. Khan, 'Development of Irrigation and Drinking Water in Baluchistan', The *Muslim Supplement*, 24 October 1984, p. 3. This entire supplement is devoted to Baluchistan and its development.
25. *United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1982* (34th edition), Department International Economics and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, New York, 1984.
26. Kerr, *op. cit.* (note 2), p. 65.
27. Inger Boesen, *Towards The Self-Reliance of Afghan Refugees?: A study of need and feasibility of establishing income-generating and skill-training programmes for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, particularly with a view to women*, Danish Refugee Council, P.O. Box 53 DK-1002, Copenhagen K, Denmark; NH Dupree, 'Women Among Afghan Refugees', *Afghanistan Forum*, Vol. XII, no. 2, March, 1984, p. 15.
28. Louis Dupree, 'Anthropology in Afghanistan', *AUFS Reports*, South Asian Series, Vol. XX, no. 3, 1976; also, Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton University, 1980, pp. 68–64.
29. Louis Dupree, *op. cit* (note 28, Princeton), pp. 164ff; Richard Tapper, 'Nomadism in Modern Afghanistan: Asset or Anachronism?', Chapter 8 in L. Dupree, L. Albert eds. *Afghanistan in the 1970s* (New York, Praeger, 1974), pp. 126–143; Bahram Tavakolian, 'Women and Socio-economic Change among Sheikhanzai Nomads of Western Afghanistan', *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 38, no. 3, summer 1984, pp. 433–453.
30. 5 November 1984; reported in *FBIS* (Foreign Information Information Service), 8 November 1984. A more extensive diatribe was given by Babrak Karmal to an Indian journalist on 18 September in which he stated specifically, that 'Those who are called by imperialists as "Afghan Refugees" are primarily nomadic people who through centuries move from south and south-west towards north and east and vice-versa with climatic changes. After the April revolution these nomads were the first to fall victim to an international conspiracy . . . traditional routes were closed . . . they were thrown out of their tents and confined within camps installed by the imperialist forces (FBIS, 20 September 1984).
31. Hasan Kawun Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, (University of Texas Press, 1979).
32. Richard F. Strand, 'The Evolution of Anti-Communist Resistance in Eastern Nuristan', in M. Nazif Shahrani and R. L. Canfield, eds. *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives*, Institute of

International Studies (Research Series No. 57), University of California, Berkeley, 1984. This work discusses root causes inside Afghanistan which forced the refugee exodus: from Nuristan, Eastern Afghanistan, Qataghan, Badakhshan, Bamiyan, Turkistan, Western, and Southern Afghanistan; with a special chapter on the assault on the honor of women.

33. The *New York Times*, 4 August 1982; Ekber Menemencioglu, 'Afghans Resettled in Turkey', in *Refugees* (newspaper), No. 8, August 1982; N. H. Dupree, 'The Afghan Kirghiz in Turkey', *Afghanistan Forum*, Vol. XII, no. 2, March 1984, p. 21.
34. N. H. Dupree, 'Allah is Pleased' in, 'Baluchistan,' *Afghanistan Forum*, Vol. XIII, no. 1, pp. 23–25.
35. 'Dependency syndromes', *Refugees Magazine*, February (no. 2), 1984, p. 33.
36. UNHCR, International Labour Office, *Tradition and Dynamism among Afghan Refugees*, 1983 Report of an ILO mission to Pakistan in November 1982 on income-generating activities for Afghan Refugees.
37. A major theme at the Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), held in Geneva 9–11 July 1984. For delegate comments, see *Refugees Magazine*, September (no. 9), 1984, pp. 21–32.